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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 12-4426 
______ 
 
     ANGELA ZIMMERLINK 
      Appellant    
 
v. 
 
VINCENT ZAPOTSKY; VINCENT VICITES; FAYETTE COUNTY 
   
 ______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (District Court No. 2-10-cv-00237) 
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Cynthia Reed Eddy 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 10, 2013 
 
Before:  SMITH, GARTH, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 13, 2013) 
 
 
______ 
 
OPINION 
______ 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant, Angela Zimmerlink, appeals from an order of the Magistrate 
Judge (Eddy, J.) granting summary judgment to defendants-appellees Vincent 
Zapotsky, Vincent Vicites, and Fayette County (“the County”). 
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the judgment of the Magistrate Judge. 
I 
 Because we write principally for the benefit of the parties, we recite only 
those facts necessary to our disposition.  Zimmerlink is one of three elected 
County Commissioners of the Board of Commissioners (“the Board”) for Fayette 
County, Pennsylvania.  At all times relevant to this case, Zimmerlink served on the 
Board alongside Zapotosky and Vicites, both of whom are Democrats.  As the sole 
Republican Commissioner, Zimmerlink frequently clashed with her Democratic 
colleagues and served as a dissenting vote and voice.   
Between January 2008 and December 2010, hostilities escalated among the 
Commissioners.  Zapotosky and Vicites allegedly arranged numerous secret 
meetings to discuss County business without providing notice to Zimmerlink or 
seeking her input.  Additionally, the two Democratic Commissioners allegedly 
engaged in contractual negotiations with developers and other third parties.  When 
debates over the 2010 budget grew polarized, Zapotosky and Vicites skipped 
meetings with Zimmerlink but continued planning a budget together and meeting 
with other County officials regarding County finances.  Because of her exclusion 
from clandestine meetings and resulting lack of knowledge about County affairs, 
Zimmerlink “was forced to abstain” from five Board votes regarding County 
staffing and contracting issues.  Appendix at 18.   
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The alleged conspiracy against Zimmerlink also resulted in a lawsuit by a 
local family against the County.  On January 16, 2009, the Cellurale family sued 
the County and Zimmerlink for selectively enforcing the County zoning code 
against the family’s land.  Zimmerlink alleges that Zapotosky was a friend of the 
Cellurale family and encouraged them to sue Zimmerlink in retaliation for her 
political opposition to Zapotosky and Vicites.  The case settled prior to discovery.   
While the Cellurale case was still pending, however, Zimmerlink alleges 
that Zapotosky and Vicites refused to cooperate with her in the County’s defense.  
She alleges that they “instructed a county employee to manipulate the minutes of 
the November 19, 2009 Board meetings [sic] to mischaracterize public comments” 
related to the Cellulare lawsuit to “vilify” her.  Id. at 39.  Additionally, despite 
instructions from the County’s counsel to refrain from commenting publicly on the 
lawsuit, both Zapotosky and Vicites made public statements and wrote editorials 
blaming Zimmerlink for zoning enforcement issues.  Zimmerlink alleges that 
because of the other Commisioners’ conduct, she was forced to hire her own 
attorney at her own expense.
 1
   
On December 20, 2010, Zimmerlink filed an amended complaint brought 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
2
 alleging violations of her First and Fourteenth 
                                                 
1
 The County subsequently retained separate counsel for Zimmerlink.   
 
2
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
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Amendment rights.  She generally asserted that: (1) she had been retaliated against 
because of her political views and political speech in violation of her rights under 
the First Amendment; and (2) this retaliation had violated her right to equal 
protection of the law under a “class of one” theory.  
Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint.  The District Court 
(Cercone, J.), on recommendation of Magistrate Judge Cathy Bissoon, denied the 
motion.  Following discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment.  As to 
the First Amendment claim, defendants argued that: (1) Zimmerlink failed to 
adduce evidence to establish that she was retaliated against because of her political 
affiliation or any other protected speech; and (2) they were shielded by qualified 
immunity.  As to the Equal Protection claim, defendants argued that: (1) there was 
insufficient evidence to establish that they had violated Zimmerlink’s rights under 
the Equal Protection Clause; and (2) the Equal Protection claim was duplicative of 
the First Amendment claim.  Finally, defendants argued that because the First 
Amendment retaliation and Equal Protection claims were deficient, any claims 
against the County must also be dismissed. 
                                                                                                                                                 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be 
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was 
unavailable.  For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable 
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the 
District of Columbia.” 
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On November 29, 2012, the Magistrate Judge granted defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment.
3
  The Magistrate Judge held that the alleged acts of 
retaliation were insufficient “to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 
exercising her First Amendment rights.”  Id. at 11; McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 
170 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 234-35 (3d Cir. 
2000)).  On this ground, the Magistrate Judge granted summary judgment on the 
First Amendment claim and did not reach issue of causation defendants’ had 
raised.   
As to the Equal Protection claim, the Magistrate Judge held that a “‘class of 
one’ equal protection claim is not cognizable in the public employment context.”  
App’x at 18 (citing Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591 (2008)).  
Further, the Magistrate Judge held that even if the claim were legally cognizable, 
Zimmerlink had “failed to adduce evidence that Defendants had no rational basis 
for treating her differently.  To the contrary, it is axiomatic and expected in the 
political arena that elected officials treat political allies differently than political 
foes.”  Id.   
 Finally, as to the question of the County’s municipal liability, the 
Magistrate Judge also granted summary judgment because: (1) Zimmerlink’s 
underlying claims against Zapotosky and Vicites had failed; and (2) even if 
Zimmerlink had successfully alleged any constitutional violations, the record 
                                                 
3
 The case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Eddy on October 27, 2011, and the 
parties subsequently consented to her jurisdiction. 
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failed to show how any municipal law, policy, custom, rule, or regulation 
contributed to the violation of her rights under the standard for municipal liability 
articulated in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 
(1978) (“[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made 
by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent 
official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible 
under § 1983.”). 
  This timely appeal followed. 
II 
 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Viera v. 
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 2011).  We must determine, 
therefore, whether the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
movant, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant 
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).  
III 
This appeal presents two primary issues: (1) whether the Magistrate Judge 
improperly granted summary judgment sua sponte on the basis of the “person of 
ordinary firmness” element of the First Amendment claim; and (2) whether the 
Magistrate Judge erred in deciding that Zimmerlink’s claims were deficient as a 
matter of law. 
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 We first address Zimmerlink’s contention that the Magistrate Judge 
improperly granted summary judgment sua sponte on the “person of ordinary 
firmness” element.   
In order to state a § 1983 claim for retaliation in violation of the First 
Amendment, a plaintiff must show “(1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) 
retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising 
his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between the constitutionally 
protected conduct and the retaliatory action.”  Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 
F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006).  “[T]he key question in determining whether a 
cognizable First Amendment claim has been stated is whether ‘the alleged 
retaliatory conduct was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 
exercising his First Amendment rights.’”  McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)); see 
also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 589 n. 10 (1998) (“The reason why 
such retaliation offends the Constitution is that it threatens to inhibit exercise of 
the protected right.”). 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) provides that “[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable 
time to respond, the court may . . . (2) grant the motion on grounds not raised by a 
party . . . .”  Notice is sufficient when “the targeted party ‘had reason to believe 
the court might reach the issue and received a fair opportunity to put its best foot 
forward.’”  Gibson v. Mayor & Council of City of Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215, 
223-24 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Leyva v. On the Beach, Inc., 171 F.3d 717, 720 
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(1st Cir.1999)).  Further, no additional notice is required if there is: (1) a fully 
developed record; (2) a lack of prejudice to the parties; and (3) a decision on a 
purely legal issue.  Id. at 224.  Even if a court fails to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 56(f), however, any such error “may be excused if the failure 
was a ‘harmless error.’” Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 1989). 
In their motion for summary judgment, defendants focused their First 
Amendment argument primarily on the causation prong of the retaliation inquiry.  
Nevertheless, their briefing and Zimmerlink’s response clearly revolved around 
the ability of one elected official to bring a First Amendment retaliation claim 
against other elected officials.  While the “person of ordinary firmness” element 
was not the explicit thrust of either side’s arguments, the parties recited the correct 
legal standard that included this element and raised arguments that were applicable 
to all three elements.  In ruling on the motion, the Magistrate Judge did not 
address the causation prong because the allegedly retaliatory action did not reach 
the requisite deterrent threshold.   
We hold that the Magistrate Judge did not improperly grant summary 
judgment sua sponte on a new issue; rather, the Magistrate Judge focused on an 
element that was essential to, but did not comprise the brunt of, defendants’ 
argument.  Cf. Armour v. County of Beaver, Pa., 271 F.3d 417, 433 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(reversing a district court’s decision when summary judgment was granted sua 
sponte on an issue that the movant had argued should be reserved for a jury). 
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To the extent that the Magistrate Judge did not provide the specific notice 
outlined in Rule 56(f), however, this case satisfies the requirements outlined in 
Gibson, supra, making additional notice unnecessary.  First, the extensive record 
fails to demonstrate – and Zimmerlink fails to argue – that inadequate discovery 
occurred or that the parties did not examine the facts relevant to the “person of 
ordinary firmness” inquiry.  Second, the record and Zimmerlink’s arguments do 
not establish prejudice.
4
  And third, the Magistrate Judge’s decision rests on a 
purely legal issue.   
IV 
While Zimmerlink may have satisfied the first requirement of a First 
Amendment retaliation claim, she has not satisfied the second requirement that the 
retaliatory conduct must have been “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from exercising his constitutional rights.”  Thomas, 463 F.3d at 296.   
In Monteiro, this Court emphasized the clear right of elected public 
officials to disagree publicly with other government officials.  436 F.3d at 404.  In 
Monteiro, the plaintiff council member (Monteiro) engaged in a spirited dispute 
with the council president during a public council meeting.  Id. at 400.  In an effort 
to silence Monteiro, the council president ordered municipal officers to arrest 
Monteiro and remove him from the meeting.  Id. at 401.  However, Monteiro, 
                                                 
4
 Because of the absence of prejudice, any error in not providing additional notice 
was harmless.  Rose, 871 F.2d at 342. 
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relied upon by Zimmerlink, is not this case.  While Zimmerlink argues that 
Zapotosky and Vicites met without her both as a pair and with third parties, the 
record fails to demonstrate that they prevented her from speaking or enacted the 
sort of formal punishment that the council president employed in Monteiro.  A 
retaliation claim is not the proper vehicle for the resolution of quotidian disputes 
among elected officials.  Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (“In 
times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to 
legislative conduct and as readily believed.  Courts are not the place for such 
controversies.  Self-discipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for 
discouraging or correcting such abuses.” (footnote omitted)).  If we were to allow 
Zimmerlink’s claim to go forward, “it would . . . subject[] to judicial review all 
sorts of politically motivated conduct committed within the confines of 
legislatures and best left within the legislative sphere.”  Camacho v. Brandon, 317 
F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir. 2003).  Further, “[i]t would trivialize the First Amendment 
to hold that harassment for exercising the right of free speech was always 
actionable no matter how unlikely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from that 
exercise.”  Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Bart v. 
Telford, 677 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.1982)).  
The facts alleged in this case – the harassment, the stealthy negotiating with 
third parties, and the public statements – may have been unpleasant and 
unprofessional, but they hardly approach the extreme conduct that gives rise to a 
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First Amendment retaliation claim.
5
  Cf. Camacho, 317 F.3d at 166 (Walker, J., 
concurring) (“courts should intervene in only the most severe cases of legislative 
retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights, thereby allowing ample 
room for the hurly burly of legislative decisionmaking.” (emphasis added)).   
Finally, we hold that Zimmerlink’s remaining claims are also legally 
deficient.  Zimmerlink concedes that her equal protection claim is “functionally 
identical to” her retaliation cause of action.  Like the First Amendment claim, 
therefore, it must fail.  The Supreme Court has “recognized successful equal 
protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she 
has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that 
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”   Vill. of Willowbrook v. 
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).  In this case, the dispute in question is a political 
one, and Zimmerlink has provided no basis to conclude that it is irrational that a 
politician would treat a political ally differently than a political opponent.   
Additionally, because no claims against the individual defendants survive, 
Zimmerlink’s municipal liability claims against the County were properly 
dismissed by the Magistrate Judge.  See Williams v. West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 
467 (3d Cir. 1989). 
                                                 
5
 Because Zapotsky’s and Vicites’s conduct was insufficient to deter a person of 
ordinary firmness from exercising her First Amendment rights, we do not address 
the causation element of the retaliation claim. 
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 The judgment of the Magistrate Judge will therefore be affirmed.  
 
 
